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Ethical communication during crisis response is often assessed by external perceptions
of the organization’s intentions, rather than an assessment of the organization’s com-
municative behaviors. This can easily lead researchers to draw editorial conclusions
about an organization’s ethics in crisis response rather than accurately describing its
communicative behaviors. The case of BP’s 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico provides
a prime example for the importance of accurately assessing the ethical content of an
organization’s crisis response because the ethics of BP’s response have been discussed in
news and academic sources; yet little direct examination of the ethical content in BP’s
response has occurred. The findings have implications for communication ethics, social
media engagement, and crisis communication more generally.
1. Introduction
‘Sorry’ used to be the hardest word to say duringcrises for fear of legal liability (Patel & Reinsch,
2003). Today, however, organizations and prominent
individuals who are accused of wrongdoing increas-
ingly face pressure to apologize to stakeholders to
maintain a good image, because it is ‘morally the cor-
rect action’ (Benoit & Pang, 2008) and to diffuse some
of the anger and hostility directed at them (Hearit,
1994). Research has found that although apology is
the most effective crisis strategy (Kim, Avergy & Lar-
iscy, 2009), sympathy and compensation can be equally
effective as apology (Choi & Lin, 2009). Additionally,
apology is often accompanied by affirmative state-
ments such as those where the organization accepts
responsibility (Pace, Fediuk & Botero, 2010), demon-
strates corrective action (Blaney, Benoit & Brazeal,
2002) and can work to atone for the transgression
(Jerome, 2008). Yet these factors are seldom consid-
ered together as a form of ethical apology. Therefore,
drawing on research and theory related to atonement,
ethics and apology (see, e.g., Bauman, 2011; Hearit &
Borden, 2006; Koesten & Rowland, 2004; Simola,
2003) as well as crisis response strategies, this study
endeavours to develop a more nuanced understanding
of the structure of ethical apology as representing an
organization’s communicative behaviors emphasizing
its relationships and responsibilities to stakeholders
(Bauman, 2011).
Unfortunately, as Bauman (2011) argues, research
exploring ethical approaches to managing crisis
response is not well developed. Perhaps this is
because, as Coombs and Holladay (2008) argue –
apology has been over-promoted as ‘the’ response (p.
252). However, Xu and Li (2013) argue, the two most
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd DOI: 10.1111/1468-5973.12110
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management Volume 24 Number 3 September 2016
Published in Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management,
Vol 24, Issue 3, April 2016, Pages 148-161
DOI 10.1111/1468-5973.12110
dominant theories in crisis communication – Benoit’s
image repair theory and Coombs’ situational crisis
communication theory – are limited because the theo-
ries are instrumental; effectively identifying ‘playbooks’
for organizations to follow instead of focusing on rela-
tional factors, like ethics, as important components to
crisis response. Therefore, by adopting a stakeholder
relationship management perspective instead of an
instrumental perspective, the ethical components
related to apology and atonement may be more
actively integrated into theory building and application.
With an increasing body of research suggesting that
‘authentic’ corporate social responsibility is a critical
factor in not only minimizing the impact of crises on
organizations (e.g., Kim, 2013; Lacey, Kennett-Hensel
& Manolis, 2014; Xu et al., 2013), but also as an
important approach to responding to crises them-
selves (e.g., Diers, 2012; Haigh & Brubaker, 2010; Pio-
trowski & Guyette, 2010), the centrality of evaluating
the ethical content of crisis response as an integral
component to evaluating crisis response is important.
Certainly, this resonates with the demands from a
modern public relations environment that requires
organizations to more ethically engage with many dif-
ferent stakeholder groups (Botan, 1997; Jerome, 2008;
Kim, 2013; Shepard, 2009; Xu et al., 2013).
In his evaluation of ethical approaches to crisis lead-
ership, Bauman (2011) directly critiqued BP’s crisis
response to the 2010 spill in the Gulf of Mexico stat-
ing, ‘The perceived callousness of their response along
with a few CEO gaffes have hurt BP’s reputation’ (p.
293). In this critique of BP, Bauman also suggests that
future research should categorize organizational crisis
response as a way to evaluate the concept of ethical
approaches to crisis management. Using a controver-
sial case, like the 2010 BP spill, to directly examine
the structure of ethical apology affords us an opportu-
nity to better develop theory and explore its practical
implications because there is a difference in evaluating
message impact and the ethics of the message itself so
that we are not merely recommending strategy based
on what will have the greatest influence, but an ethical
response strategy (Xu et al., 2013).
Second, the BP case is also important because of its
magnitude (Black, 2010). As more details emerged, it
became clear that it was not merely an accident but a
major organizational transgression (Coombs & Holla-
day, 2002; Diers & Tomaino, 2010; Pearson & Clair,
1998). The scope of the Gulf disaster also meant
relentless media coverage receiving an estimated 22%
of the US news coverage from the initial explosion
through July, 2010 (Pew Research Center, 2010). Thus,
when addressing the largest oil industry gathering after
taking over, the first thing new BP CEO Bob Dudley
did was to apologize: ‘BP is sorry. BP gets it. BP is
changing’ (Hargreaves, 2011). Finally, the BP case is
analytically and theoretically rich because whereas
most longitudinal studies emphasize image recovery
process after a crisis, the opportunity to examine an
organization’s messaging during a prolonged crisis
should be seized (Reierson, Sellnow & UImer, 2009).
Consequently, this study extends Frandsen and
Johansen’s (2010) discussion of ‘meta-apology’ (p. 362)
to explore the ethics of crisis response itself, rather
than explore its effect on public opinion or politics.
As such, our goal is to join together a disparate litera-
ture all trying to answer the same question – how can
we evaluate the authenticity or ethical sincerity of an
organization’s demonstration of remorse after a major
transgression without considering how the apologies
are perceived? In so doing, we will join the ethics of
care, atonement theory and the apologetic ethics
framework in a relationship-based framework to pro-
pose a model of ‘ethical apology’ that will be exam-
ined through the analysis of BP’s response to the
Deepwater Horizon crisis.
2. A relationship-based ethical apology
framework
In her analysis of public evaluations of BP 1 year after
the 2010 Gulf spill, Diers (2012) proposed a relational
model of corporate image assessment, arguing that we
can better assess the degree to which an organiza-
tion’s efforts to communicate corporate social respon-
sibility have been successful. In the case of BP, Diers
(2012) found that while its message strategy had lim-
ited positive effects on stakeholder assessments of BP
as a ‘socially responsible’ organization, the company
did seem to ‘open the lines of communication
between stakeholders and the company’ (p. 178).
Additionally, instead of being callous as Bauman (2011)
suggested, previous analysis of BP’s crisis response
strategies (see Diers-Lawson & Donohue, 2013) found
that BP’s response to the crisis centred on messages
of corporate social responsibility with a particularly a
strong emphasis on communicating caring about the
people and environment affected by the spill. Thus,
adopting a stakeholder relationship perspective lays a
stronger groundwork for analysing the ethics of crisis
communication compared to other more instrumental
perspectives (Xu et al., 2013).
.However, we must begin with a conceptualization
of ‘apology’. Although most studies focusing on apol-
ogy apply a specific conceptualization of apology
which may be: a ‘direct acknowledgement of guilt
and an expression of remorse’ (Tyler, 1997, p. 53);
provide specific elements like transcendence and dif-
ferentiation (e.g., Ware & Linkugel, 1973); or reme-
diation, repentance and rectification (e.g., Coombs,
2000) our goal is to better understand the overall
structure of ethical apology. So, we view apology as
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management
Volume 24 Number 3 September 2016© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Ethical Apology 149
direct communication of contrition – that is some
form of ‘We are sorry’ – (e.g., Benoit, 2004; Benoit
& Czerwinski, 1997; Mohamed et al., 1999) in the
face of the crisis. We suggest that approaching analy-
ses of apology by including as many possible tactics
to accompany apology will help us to better evaluate
whether the content of an organization’s apology is,
in fact, ethical. Therefore, in this literature review,
we develop a relationship-based ethical apology
framework based on joining three theoretical per-
spectives: the ethics of care, atonement theory and
the apologetic ethics framework.
2.1 Ethics of care perspective
Our intention is not to develop a mechanism for judg-
ing the ethics of intent, but to suggest how ethical
apology could be structured. We begin by adopting an
the ethics of care perspective (Simola, 2003, 2005),
which defines ethical action in crises as doing what is
right for those affected by the crisis (Simola, 2003). In
comparing the ethical approaches leaders of organiza-
tions may use, Bauman (2011) argues that an ethics of
care perspective is best for evaluating ethical crisis
management because it balances stakeholder relation-
ships with the emotional and the economic costs of a
crisis. In a modern public relations environment that
values relationship management, direct engagement
and social responsibility (see, e.g., Hong, Yang & Rim,
2010; Pang & Cameron, 2011), Simola (2003) argues
that that adopting an ethics of care approach during a
crisis is central to the maintenance and enhancements
of relationships in postcrisis contexts.
In the ethics of care approach, it is necessary for an
organization to acknowledge the harm, apologize and
act to resolve the problem; however, it must also
show that it cares about those affected (Bauman,
2011) by: (1) communicating responsibility for those
affected (Simola, 2003); communicating that its actions
are voluntary – they want to act (Simola, 2003); and it
must engage in dialogue that communicates an interest
in hearing, understanding and being directly responsive
to the voices, experiences and situations experienced
by affected community members (de Brooks & Way-
mer, 2009; Carroll, 2009; Simola, 2003).
2.2 Atonement theory
Across analyses of corporate social responsibility,
ethics and crisis response, the question of an organiza-
tion’s ethical authenticity often means making a judg-
ment as to whether the organization’s messages and
behaviours are motivated by genuine interest (e.g.,
Botan, 1997; Bauman, 2011; Kim, 2013; Koesten et al.,
2004; Lacey et al., 2014; Shepard, 2009). The problem
with determining whether an organization’s actions
are ‘authentic’ or efforts to merely improve their
image is that it can include supposition about an orga-
nization’s intent. Research suggests there are a host of
factors that can influence these kinds of judgments
and that they are seldom ‘objective’ (Kim, 2013).
In the case of BP, we have evidence of the difficulty
in making this kind of distinction in academic research.
For example, in Smithson and Venette’s (2013) analysis
of BP’s use of stonewalling during Congressional hear-
ings, the authors conclude that BP’s use of stonewal-
ling tactics may have hurt its image recovery.
However, some of their conclusions and indictment of
the ethics of BP’s response were included such subjec-
tive supposition:
BP obviously wanted to silence Abbott because the
employee was laid off after voicing his concerns to
the company about their unsafe practices. Presum-
ably the company had everything to lose by taking
responsibility for the Deepwater Horizon failure
and admitting to a culture of carelessness. Thus, the
company denied access to information and con-
trolled the conversation by stonewalling (p. 406).
For an analysis demonstrating evidence of a stone-
walling strategy during Congressional hearings, this
kind of a statement would seem to be a poor applica-
tion of the study’s key findings and contributions. As
such, evaluating the ethics of crisis response must be
based in an approach that focuses on the content of
response. Therefore, the second element in develop-
ing a model of ethical apology is to identify a mecha-
nism to more objectively evaluate message ethics. In
this literature review, the theory of atonement is dis-
cussed as a key mechanism for assessing an organiza-
tion’s ethical apology because it is built on measurable
conceptualizations of authenticity in apology (Jerome,
2008; Koesten et al., 2004; Shepard, 2009).
As an example of a unique type of apologia, atone-
ment’s conceptual roots certainly come from a reli-
gious tradition where the ‘sinner’ accepts
responsibility for wrongs and seeks to make just retri-
bution to those wronged (Koesten et al., 2004); how-
ever, it is distinctive from typical apology because
while atonement may result in long-term image
restoration its shorter term goal is to gain forgiveness
and begin to restore the relationship with those
‘wronged’ (Jerome, 2008; Koesten et al., 2004; Shep-
ard, 2009). Koesten et al., (2004) describe atonement
as, ‘a means of accepting guilt to create a new image
as a redeemed individual or nation’ (p. 70).
Atonement theory (see, e.g., Jerome, 2008; Koes-
ten et al., 2004) identifies five features of atonement
where the transgressor: (1) acknowledges wrongdo-
ing and asks for forgiveness; (2) demonstrates an atti-
tude of change and relationship renewal; (3)
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specifically identifies the steps that will be taken to
develop a ‘different’ kind of present and future; (4)
demonstrates the authenticity of apology; and (5)
conducts the atonement – that is the specific actions
to correct the problem and renew the relationship –
in public. Atonement must be supported by distinc-
tive and measurable actions. From a crisis response
respective, this suggests that part of responding to a
crisis will be to demonstrate specific actions that the
organization is taking to correct the negative impact
of the transgression.
2.3 Apologetic ethics framework
Finally, we must address the specific content and
other contextual factors influencing the authenticity of
ethical apology in order to better understand how to
differentiate between other types of apologia and ethi-
cal apology. Certainly, the ethics of care and atone-
ment theory provide effective insights on the content
of apology; however, they do not fully explain ethical
apology’s content. Hearit et al.’s (2006) apologetic
ethics framework expands ‘apology’ from merely say-
ing ‘We’re sorry’ to a complex multilayered approach
and atonement approach supporting other descrip-
tions of a broadly ‘accommodative’ crisis response
strategy (see, e.g., Diers, 2007). Frandsen et al. (2010)
described Hearit et al.’s (2006) framework as a ‘more
practically oriented model which puts forward a nor-
mative standard for ethically correct crisis communi-
cation. . .’ (p. 353). There are two components to the
framework: the manner of apology and the apology’s
content.
2.3.1 Manner of apology
Hearit et al. (2006) argue about an apology’s manner
if organizations are interested in both communicating
ethically and image recovery. Sincerity, in this case,
communicates good faith and desires to reconcile ver-
sus merely manage their image. For example, if the
timing of the apology matters then it should be articu-
lated as soon as an organization recognizes its trans-
gression. If an apology is only articulated after
stakeholders demand it, the strength of the apology
would be diminished and the apologist would be per-
ceived as not being voluntary or sincere. Apologies
must address all stakeholders including anyone affected
and offended by the apologist, not just strategic stake-
holders. Finally, apologies must be appropriate in con-
text, suggesting that the site, location and medium of
communication selected to communicate the apology
all must be appropriate to the situation.
2.3.2 Content of apology
Hearit et al.’s (2006) conceptualization of apology
suggests the manner in which the apology is con-
ducted would be compromised if the content of the
apology was insufficient. Thus, they argue that there
are several characteristics that the content of an
apology should have. Initially, apologies must explic-
itly acknowledge wrongdoing and without pointing
fingers at others nor dissociating or distancing them-
selves or their organization from the transgression.
Second, the apologist must communicate identifica-
tion with injured stakeholders by demonstrating
empathy with the way in which stakeholders have
been hurt thus communicating an understanding of
‘the depth and effect of the offence in a way that
honours the experience of those who have been
wronged’ (p. 70). Additionally, the apologist must
ask for forgiveness. Third, once they ask for forgive-
ness, the apologist must seek reconciliation; working
to restore its relationship with stakeholders. Fourth,
the apologist must fully disclose information related
to the offence. Fifth, the apologist must also provide
explanations that address legitimate concerns and
expectations of the stakeholders. Finally, it is not
enough to merely apologize, the content of the
apology must also provide assurances that the
offence will not be committed again and demon-
strate a commitment to voluntarily provide appro-
priate compensation for those affected.
Drawing together ethics of care, atonement and the
apologetic ethics framework, we propose a model of
ethical apology (see Figure 1). Based on the manner
and content of the apology, we can then draw conclu-
sions about its ethical content. From a theoretical per-
spective, the most important element is the content –
in order for crisis response to be an example of ethi-
cal apology, it should have the elements of acknowl-
edgement, empathy and action.
As previous research has found that source, con-
text and timing are all important factors that can
affect the ethical appropriateness of apology, these
must also be evaluated. However, the specific influ-
ence of these factors is still unclear and must be more
thoroughly investigated. In addition, because this
model represents a new conceptualization of ethical
crisis response, the question of what it might look like
during a crisis is yet unclear. For these reasons and
because the concept of ethical apology as a meaningful
part of crisis response remains underdeveloped, we
propose the following research questions:
RQ 1: To what degree does BP’s response in owned
sources demonstrate the qualities of ethical apology?
RQ 1A: To what degree did BP acknowledge
responsibility?
RQ 1B: To what degree did BP demonstrate empa-
thy?
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RQ 1C: To what degree did BP demonstrate cor-
rective action?
RQ 2: To what degree did BP’s response demon-
strate an ethical manner?
RQ 2A: Did context influence BP’s communication
of ethical apology?
RQ 2B: Did timing influence BP’s communication
of ethical apology?
3. Methods
In the context of organizational crises and crisis
response tactics, quantitative content analysis is a
strong method to employ, particularly when analysing
different media outlets (Andsager & Smiley, 1998; Mol-
leda, Connolly-Ahern & Quinn, 2005).
3.1 Coding
The unit of analysis was operationalized as a single
message (i.e., a single press release, post, or tweet)
because previous studies of crisis response messages
(Benoit et al., 1997; Elsbach, 1994; Greer & Moreland,
2003; Henderson, 2003; Kauffman, 2001) emphasize
that when studying crisis communication, examining
the interplay of tactics within a message employed
affords researchers more information about an organi-
zation’s strategy.
The coding scheme was based on manifest content
for each variable with operationalization from previous
research (see Diers, 2007; Diers et al., 2010). Primary
issues (i.e., those in the headline of a release or the
primary focus of a post or tweet) were derived using
a process of grounded theory causal coding, as
described by Strauss and Corbin (1990). The analysis
of the emergent issues during the Gulf of Mexico
EvaluationContentManner
Source (AEF)
• Owned Media
Context (AEF)
• Consistency of 
messaging across 
crisis topics
• Consistency of 
messaging across 
communication 
situations
Timing (AEF)
• Apology must occur 
early
• Message evolution 
over time to 
demonstrate 
responsiveness
Acknowledgment
• Acknowledge 
wrongdoing (A, AEF)
• Ask for forgiveness 
(A, AEF)
• Steps explained to 
develop ‘different’ 
future (A)
• Expression of regret 
(AEF)
• Reconciliation (AEF)
Empathy
• Be responsive to 
voices, experiences, & 
situations of the 
affected (EC, AEF)
• Public atonement (A)
• Communicate 
identification with 
stakeholders (A, AEF)
Action
• Demonstrate changes 
in attitude & 
relationship with 
stakeholders (A, AEF)
• Directly address 
legitimate stakeholder 
concerns (AEF)
• Emphasize 
responsibility to 
others/ doing ‘what’s 
right’ for the affected 
(EC, A)
• Demonstrate 
remuneration is 
voluntary; sincere 
interest in action (EC, 
A)
Ethical apologist:
• Demonstrates all 
content attributes 
across crisis response
• Message consistency 
across sources
• Message consistency 
across contexts
• Effective timing
Figure 1. Model of ethical apology Notes: A, Atonement theory; AEF, Apologetic Ethics Framework; EC, Ethics of care
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revealed 12 unique issues across the five-month crisis
(see Table 1).
Members of a graduate course in Organizational
Communication coded portions of the data as a part
of a class project. The coders were each assigned data
from a single channel. Each coder received a codebook
and a 50-minute training session with coding examples.
Ten percent of the sample was randomly selected and
independently coded by the project leader. An overall
intercoder reliability analysis was conducted finding the
coding scheme to be reliable (a = .83).
3.2 Sample
To analyse research question one, identifying the
structure of BP’s apology in the Gulf crisis, all official
press releases, which were posted on its website dur-
ing the crisis, all Facebook posts and all Twitter tweets
were used for several reasons. First, press releases
have traditionally reflected the driving messaging strat-
egy for organizations (Bivins, 2011; Wilcox &
Cameron, 2009). Second, the influence of social media
is undeniable (Moore, 2004) because it represents an
interactive (or two-way) platform for organizations to
manage both crises and the surrounding issues (Gon-
zalez-Herrero & Smith, 2008). Additionally, because
this research focuses on the structure of BP’s atone-
ment, it was most appropriate to begin with BP-
owned messaging because the media typically select
and frame the information (or direct quotations) that
they use from organizations during crises to serve
their commercial and/or political ends (Aalbert, van
Aelst & Curran, 2010; An & Gower, 2009; Andsager
et al., 1998; Berger, 2009; Crider, 2010; Duhe & Zoch,
1994; Iyengar & Curran, 2009). Thus, for research
question one, all messages from BP-owned media
including some component of accommodation
(n = 1,482), including corrective action, apology, com-
passion for those affected, offering reassurances about
the future, eliciting sympathy for the organization,
transparency about the situation and asking or refer-
ring to stakeholders volunteering to help redress the
situation were included (see Diers, 2007). In addition
to contextualize BP’s apology, we also examined other
Table 1. Primary Contexts for the BP Gulf of Mexico Crisis
Context Description
Status updates This refers to updates on the status of the spill including technical issues,
physical problems, progress and any impact of weather. For example, announcing
delays, successes and failures.
BP response to criticism This refers to statements, releases, etc. that are directly responding to accusations,
gulf-related litigation, fines, rebukes, etc. directly related to the BP Gulf Oil Spill.
Criticisms of BP related to other topics coded elsewhere.
Spill impacts on people This refers to BP’s responses that address situations related to the economic,
human, or social costs of the Gulf spill.
BP leadership This refers to BP’s responses that address the company’s leaders, where the company’s
leaders are specifically criticized, or changes in the company’s leadership. This
context is specific to addressing issues of leadership, not merely where the leader
is quoted, rather where they are the topic of conversation.
Compensation for those affected This refers to BP’s responses that directly address the financial compensation for
people and businesses negatively impacted by the Gulf spill. This includes
references to the $20 billion fund, fraudulent claims, BP’s willingness to pay
claims and any other corrective actions taken (or desired) by BP to those affected.
Other BP issues This refers to BP responses that are in the context of other issues affecting the
company that are UNRELATED to the Gulf oil spill. For example, if BP responds
to the Lockerbie Bomber accusations, North Sea drilling or old cases.
Bad public relations This refers to BP statements that are framed in terms of evaluating the effectiveness
of BP’s public relations in light of the Gulf oil spill.
Politics This refers to BP statements that are framed in the context of American or British
politics, for example, political elections, political leaders and international diplomacy
Government response & regulation This refers to BP statements in the context of official government rebukes of BP,
drilling bans, new regulation on the oil industry, the MMS, their own coordination
with the US or British governments.
BP’s financial cost of clean-up This refers to BP statements in the context of how much the clean-up efforts are
costing, will cost or have cost. This is different from their compensation of those
affected. This can also include actions BP is taking to finance the cost of clean-up
(e.g., cancelling dividends or selling oil interests in other places).
Environmental impacts This refers to all BP statements in the context of the environmental damage,
environmental research, environmental recovery, etc. This may range from
animals affected to wetlands, etc.
Congressional hearings This refers to all BP statements in the context of US Congressional Hearings
or British Parliament inquiries.
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factors such as message subject, the influence of time
– measured by the date of the response, and method
of communication – all factors identified in the litera-
ture review as influencing the communication of
atonement.
The duration of the crisis was operationalized from
the explosion on 29 April 2010 until the well was
declared ‘officially killed’ on 21 September 2010.
While the coverage of the crisis and its lasting implica-
tions certainly warrants an extended timeline, because
our interest was crisis response during the crisis, this
was the most inclusive but clear delineation of the cri-
sis possible.
3.3 Data analysis
To answer research question one, factor analyses with
Varimax Rotation and Kaiser Normalization were con-
ducted comparing the structure of apology for each of
the three BP-owned channels to identify similarities
and differences in each. Wrench, Thomas-Maddox,
Richmond and McCroskey (2008) identify the primary
functions of factor analysis indicating that it: (1) is a
tool to establish construct validity that identifies mutu-
ally exclusive highly correlated concepts; (2) allows us
to know if the correlations between concepts are
meaningful; and that (3) exploratory factor analysis
allows researchers to determine how many concepts
the ‘scale’ is measuring. Therefore, while factor analy-
ses are typically used to establish the relationship
between survey questions, they are appropriate in
identifying the unique message strategies emerging
from a set of tactics because the goals in identifying
strategies align with the goals of exploratory factor
analyses. Factors emerging with an Eigenvalue >1 were
included as primary strategies communicated by BP for
each source. Further, correlations were performed
comparing dominant apology structures and other ‘ac-
commodative’ tactics as were Chi-square tests to
determine the degree to which tactics emerged at
greater or less than expected levels.
To evaluate the factors influencing BP’s accommoda-
tion tactics, we used a 3 (Source) 9 12 (Primary
Contexts) 9 6 (Message Month) MANOVA design
with Scheffe post hoc analyses. MANOVA is appropri-
ate when we have several dependent variables which
all measure different aspects of some cohesive theme
(i.e., ‘accommodation’ tactics) and situations where
there are likely moderate correlations between depen-
dent variables, thus reducing error.
4. Results
Overall, these results demonstrate that the structure
of BP’s apologies during the 2010 spill can be
described as ‘ethical’ apology.
4.1 Research question one
The first research question examined the structure of
BP’s atonement. By examining BP’s owned media, we
find a clear evidence of the ethical apology structure.
Across all messaging which included some element of
accommodation, BP focused on corrective action as
their dominant single tactic (n = 985). In fact, messag-
ing focusing on how BP would correct the situation in
the Gulf of Mexico exceeded all groupings of routine
communication (n = 617), antisocial or defensive
(n = 384), and efforts to emphasize interorganizational
relationships (n = 584). BP’s emphasis on corrective
action cut across all other efforts to apologize and was
significantly greater than expected (v2 (1) = 36.65;
p < .00).
Press releases offered the richest atonement detail
integrating six different accommodative tactics into
three types of atonement for the crisis (see Table 2,
for representative examples of tactics). The dominant
type of atonement in press releases was a compas-
sionate apology (Eigenvalue = 1.82, accounting for
25.95% of the variance) pairing their communication
of compassion for those affected (.78) with apology
—or recognizing their transgression (.75). BP also
used a challenged transparency (Eigenvalue = 1.40
accounting for 19.95% of the variance) approach to
communicate their atonement combing their efforts
to elicit sympathy for the difficulty of their task (.68)
with their efforts to be transparent during the crisis
(.76). Third, BP tried to emphasize a community
building (Eigenvalue = 1.27, accounting for 18.16% of
the variance) effort in their long-term commitment
to restoring the Gulf by combining their efforts to
offer assurances about their future work in the
region (.65) with soliciting and recognizing stake-
holder collaborations in the work to restore the Gulf
and its residents (.89). Each of these types of atone-
ment was correlated with the others and message
date revealing three significant correlations. Compas-
sionate apology positively correlated with community
building (r = .24), challenging transparency negatively
correlated with message date (r = .29), and com-
munity building also negatively correlated with mes-
sage date (r = .41).
BP’s messaging on Facebook also demonstrated a
compassionate apology structure (Eigenvalue = 1.18,
accounting for 16.84% of the variance) pairing com-
passion (.64) and apology (.64). However, its two
dominant atonement strategies incorporated soliciting
and recognizing volunteers in its recovery efforts
(Eigenvalue = 1.40, accounting for 20.06% of the vari-
ance) and offering reassurances about BP’s work in
the Gulf for the near future to ensure recovery
(Eigenvalue = 1.25, accounting for 17.90% of the vari-
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ance), both as single-tactic types of atonement. Each
of these was correlated with the remaining accom-
modative tactics and message date revealing seven sig-
nificant correlations. Offering assurances was
positively correlated with volunteering (r = .10) and
message date (r = .10) and negatively correlated with
corrective action (r = .19) and transparency
(r = .10). Volunteering was negatively correlated with
both compassionate apology (r = .10) and trans-
parency (r = .31). Compassionate apology was also
negatively correlated with transparency (r = .15).
Like Facebook, BP’s response Twitter also demon-
strated compassionate apology (Eigenvalue = 1.07
accounting for 15.24% of the variance) pairing com-
passion (.71) with apology (.61). Like with Facebook,
seeking and recognizing volunteers were BP’s primary
atonement strategy on Twitter (Eigenvalue = 1.41,
accounting for 20.08% of the variance). While BP also
offered assurances (.70) on Twitter, they paired with
efforts to illicit sympathy (.69) about the challenges
they faced in moving forward to create a challenging
assurances (Eigenvalue = 1.39, accounting for 19.84%
of variance) type of apology as well. Each of these
apology types was correlated with the remaining
accommodative tactics and message date revealing
seven significant correlations. Volunteering was nega-
tively correlated with transparency (r = .29) and
message date (r = .17). Challenged assurances was
positively correlated with compassionate apology
(r = .09) and negatively correlated with corrective
action (r = .21) as well as transparency (r = .10).
Compassionate apology was also negatively correlated
with corrective action (r = .19) and transparency
(r = .25).
4.2 Research question two
Research question 2 examined the factors – source
(i.e., press release, Facebook and Twitter), primary
context (i.e., the 12 described in methods) and mes-
sage month (i.e., April, May, June, July, August and
September) – that influenced the structure of BP’s
apologies. The multivariate (see Table 3) test reveals a
significant three-way interaction between source, pri-
mary context and message month on BP’s use of apol-
ogy accounting for a total of 6% of the variance.
While seemingly small, it does suggest that BP’s struc-
ture of apology was somewhat sensitive to the situa-
tion allowing them to adapt their message across
channels, contexts and time.
Because the multivariate test was significant, the
results for the between-subjects tests for each of the
dependent variables are also relevant. These also
reveal significant three-way interactions for apology,
compassion and eliciting sympathy (see Table 4); offer-
ing assurances had three significant two-way interac-
tions for source and month, source and primary
context, and primary context and message month;
transparency had a significant two-way interaction for
source and month; and volunteering had a significant
main effect for source.
4.2.1 Primary context
These data reveal a significant but limited impact of
message context on atonement messages from BP
(see Table 5). Although 12 different contexts emerged
and nine of them had some influence on at least one of
the tactics measured only status updates, BP response to
criticism, BP leadership, environmental impacts and com-
pensation for those affected consistently influenced BP’s
use of different messages. These data indicate that when
it comes to apology, BP used apology widely.
4.2.2 Message timing
These data reveal a significant and seemingly strategic
use of different atonement messages across the dura-
tion of the crisis (see Table 6). With the exception of
September where apology was used more than in
August, apology was consistently used more often earlier
in the crisis – first emerging on April 24 and being used
weekly through June and a drop off in its use in August.
In fact, messaging changed sharply in August with a sub-
stantially greater use of offering assurances in August
than June, July or September and with BP asking for sym-
pathy substantially less in August than in both May and
June. Additionally, in September, we saw BP communi-
cate messages focusing on transparency substantially less
than in June, July or August. These data indicate that as
major events occurred, such as the capping of the well at
the end of July and anticipating the killing of the well in
September that BP adapted their messages to match
major shifts in the nature of the crisis.
5. Discussion
Taken together, BP’s structures of atonement in their
apologetic-based response to the Gulf of Mexico spill
communicated more than a simple apology; BP’s crisis
response demonstrated a multimedia communication
of ‘ethical apology’.
5.1 Stakeholder-centred atonement
These data suggest that BP’s communication beha-
viours emphasized stakeholder-centred atonement
strategy in its owned media. With its press releases,
we found an integrated structure of atonement focus-
ing first on compassionate apology – a communicated
emphasis on the people and local environment
affected by the spill. Early in the crisis, BP’s responses
also incorporated community building by inviting par-
ticipation with BP and recognizing their collaborative
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Table 2. Representative Examples of BP’s Atonement Strategies
Strategy Representative example of strategy Ethical apology category(ies)
Compassionate apology ‘Everyone at BP is heartbroken by this event, by the
loss of life and by the damage to the environment
and to the livelihoods of the people of the Gulf
Coast. It should not have happened and we are
bound and determined to learn every lesson to
try and ensure it never happens again’.
Tony Hayward, 6/3/2010
Acknowledgement Empathy
Challenged transparency ‘This event is unprecedented; no company, no one,
has ever had to attempt to deal with a situation
such as this at depths such as this before. BP,
the Unified Command, the federal authorities
and the hundreds of companies and thousands
of individuals engaged on this effort, are doing
everything we can to bring it under control
and make it good’. Doug Suttles, 5/29/2010
Action
Community building ‘The enhancements announced today will further
strengthen the Vessels of Opportunity program,
getting the right vessels into the fight in the
fairest way possible. We’ve listened carefully
to those working on this important effort,
and we appreciate the changes they’ve
recommended. This program is an important
piece of our efforts to make things right in
the Gulf of Mexico’. Doug Suttles 7/5/2010
Empathy Action
Corrective action ‘I’m focused on the response. I’m focused on
trying to eliminate the leak, trying to contain
the oil on the surface, defending the beaches,
clean up the spill and restore the lives of people
on the Gulf Coast. That’s what I intend to do’.
Tony Hayward 6/17/2010
Acknowledgement Action
Apologia ‘We failed to wrestle this beast to the ground.
We understand the importance of this. We are
deeply sorry’. Bob Dudley, 6/20/2010
Acknowledgement Empathy
Compassion ‘We appreciate that there is a great deal of stress
and anxiety across the region and as part of
our determination to make things right for the
people of the region, we are providing this
assistance now to help make sure individuals
who need help know where to turn’.
Lamar McKay, 8/16/2010
Empathy Action
Offering reassurances ‘We are determined to learn the lessons for
the future and we will be undertaking a
broad-scale review to further improve the
safety of our operations. . . to ensure that
a tragedy like this can never happen again’.
Bob Dudley, 9/8/2010
Acknowledgement Action
Eliciting sympathy ‘Whether it is fair or unfair is not the point.
I became the public face and was demonised
and vilified. BP cannot move on in the US with
me as its leader. Life isn’t fair. . . sometimes
you step off the pavement and get hit by a
bus’. Tony Hayward 7/29/2010
Acknowledgement Action
Transparency ‘BP confirmed its continuing commitment to
co-operate with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in facilitating
access by the US Government and the
public to sampling/monitoring data on
the Deepwater Horizon spill response’.
BP Press Release 5/21/2010
Action
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efforts with the community and other agencies or
individuals who could help them address the problem.
As time continued, BP began to focus on its willing-
ness to commit to the challenge (i.e., eliciting sympa-
thy and offering reassurances) of rebuilding the
communities and industries affected. Consistent with
other research on BP’s response in the Gulf more
broadly examining BP’s response strategies (Diers-
Lawson et al., 2013), these data suggest that the press
releases most emphasized this ethical apology frame-
work. However, instead of parroting the press
releases, BP’s apologetic Facebook posts reflected a
stronger emphasis on volunteer engagement and offer-
ing assurances that BP would be involved with these
communities for the long term. Similarly, BP’s apolo-
getic tweets centred on community building with vol-
unteers and the future, but the tweets painted those
assurances with a theme that BP would sacrifice to
atone. Although BP’s crisis response was largely criti-
cized, it was also praised for effectively using social
media (Shogren, 2011). Yet, in that praise, Steve Mar-
ino of Ogilvy and Mather suggested BP was wise to
just use social media as a forum for people to vent
(Shogren, 2011). Our analysis suggests that instead of
merely being a place for people to vent, BP’s messag-
ing on Facebook and Twitter seemed to emphasize
dialogic engagement and real-life collaborations with
members of the Gulf Coast community because its
posts and tweets emphasized acknowledgement, empa-
thy and action. These data support previous research
highlighting the strength and opportunities in using social
media as an opportunity for two-way engagement (Metz-
gar & Maruggi, 2009; Solis & Breakenridge, 2009), but
extend that research by demonstrating that social media
messages can expand an organization’s use of ethical
apology in response to a crisis.
5.2 The content of BP’s atonement
Taking these findings together, there are five ways that
we can describe BP’s messaging as ethical apology.
First, BP’s messaging emphasized various stakeholders
across sources and contexts espousing concern for all
of those affected. Second, its emphasis on collabora-
tion and community building communicates efforts to
reintegrate the organization as a part of the commu-
nity. Third, as evidenced in other research (e.g., Diers-
Lawson et al., 2013; Smithson et al., 2013), BP clearly
endeavored to shift some responsibility of the blame –
particularly to its operational partners Transocean and
Halliburton. However, these findings suggest that BP
separated its efforts to apologize from any shifting of
blame; instead, when the company apologized, it con-
sistently and explicitly recognized its accountability for
the crisis. Fourth, by communicating transparency
throughout the crisis, BP’s messaging shows evidence
of an espoused commitment to correcting the wrong,
its willingness to sacrifice its well-being to atone and
reconcile with its stakeholders. Finally, BP’s messaging
focused on the future as the company made assur-
ances it would make ‘things’ right and be involved in
the Gulf for the long term. Each of these reflects the
core attributes of the content of ethical apology (see
Table 2).
5.3. The manner of BP’s atonement
By taking a step back from the content of the apology
to evaluate the manner of the apology, we may better
assess the communication of BP’s remorse as well as
the factors that might have limited its success in com-
municating remorse. While only accounting for a rela-
tively small amount of the total variance, the context
and message timing reveal important characteristics of
BP’s efforts to atone for the Gulf crisis. The small eta
Table 3. Multivariate Tests
Effect Λ F df1 df2 Partial e
2
Source .76 7.14 56 10010 .04
Primary Context .89 2.21 77 8540.65 .02
Message Month .96 1.70 35 5992.66 .01
Source * Primary
Context
.57 2.09 399 9914.62 .08
Source *
Msg. Month
.71 2.41 203 9728.66 .05
Primary Context *
Msg. Month
.74 1.73 259 9824.03 .04
Source * Primary
Context *
Msg. Month
.64 1.67 399 9914.62 .06
Table 2. (continued)
Strategy Representative example of strategy Ethical apology category(ies)
Volunteering ‘I want to thank everyone for their tremendous
commitment to lead and support the
response and clean-up efforts. I really cannot
say this enough: BP wants all individuals to feel
free to share their thoughts and experiences
with journalists, if they so choose’.
Doug Suttles, 7/1/2010
Empathy
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could indicate other factors influenced BP’s atonement
or that they chose a ‘stay the course’ approach, which
seems to be a more consistent conclusion based on
these findings. Ultimately, this could damage percep-
tions that the company was genuinely responsive to
the voices, experiences and contexts of community
members.
5.3.1 Context
BP did not tailor its efforts to atone to each of the 12
primary contexts for this crisis; however, it did tailor
its response to a particular subset in this crisis
demonstrating some sensitivity to the nuances of the
situation. Based on the emergent issues (see Table 1),
there were two types of crisis within the BP Gulf cri-
sis – the material crisis stemming from the oil spill
and a series of reputational crises emerging from
gaffes. Thus, in contexts where BP was responding to
criticism, discussions about their leadership and bad
public relations where the company’s practices were
directly confronted, BP emphasized compassion for
those affected, apology and offering assurances about
Table 4. Significant Between-Subjects Tests
Effect Dependent variable MS df F p Partial e2
Source Volunteering 1.02 8 5.68 .000 .03
Source * Month Transparency .29 29 1.50 .04 .03
Offering Assurances .36 29 2.09 .001 .04
Source * Primary Context Offering Assurances .28 57 1.62 .003 .06
Primary Context * Message Month Offering Assurances .28 37 1.60 .01 .04
Source * Month * Primary Context Apology .09 57 2.84 .000 .10
Compassion .21 57 1.35 .04 .05
Eliciting Sympathy .08 57 2.44 .000 .09
Error 1,430
Table 5. Significant Scheffe Results for Primary Context
Dependent variable Test (I) Test (J)
Mean
difference (I–J) Significance
Apology Status Updates BP Response to Criticism .17 .000
BP Leadership .20 .000
Bad PR .24 .000
BP Response to Criticism Spill Impacts on People .18 .000
Compensation for Those Affected .18 .000
Environmental Impacts .19 .000
Spill Impacts on People Bad Public Relations .24 .000
BP Leadership Compensation for Those Affected .21 .000
Government Response & Regulation .16 .02
Environmental Impacts .22 .000
Compensation for Those Affected Bad Public Relations .24 .000
Bad Public Relations Environmental Impacts .25 .000
Compassion Status Updates BP Response to Criticism .26 .000
Spill Impacts on People .26 .000
BP Response to Criticism Environmental Impacts .25 .008
Spill Impacts on People Environmental Impacts .25 .000
Offering Assurances Status Updates BP Leadership .27 .008
Spill Impacts on People BP Leadership .35 .000
BP Leadership Compensation for Those Affected .34 .000
Environmental Impacts .27 .02
Eliciting Sympathy Status Updates BP Leadership .24 .000
BP Response to Criticism Spill Impacts on People .11 .007
BP Leadership .16 .000
Compensation for Those Affected .10 .01
Spill Impacts on People BP Leadership .27 .000
BP Leadership Compensation for Those Affected .26 .000
Government Response & Regulation .22 .000
BP’s Financial Cost of Clean Up .26 .000
Environmental Impacts .25 .000
Congressional Hearings .28 .000
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their role in correcting the crisis. We believe that
while BP’s messages demonstrated contrition and
focused on correcting wrongs, the manner of the
apology may explain why its apology was not viewed
as sincere in many evaluations of its crisis response.
5.3.2 Time
These data suggest the structure and messaging sur-
rounding BP’s apology-based messaging changed across
the five-month crisis. These data indicate shifts in
atonement messaging shifted with major events within
the crisis supporting a conclusion that BP communi-
cated remorse in its response to the crisis. However,
that remorse may not have been convincing. This is
the delicate balance in crisis response that previous
research (e.g., Coombs et al., 2008; Hearit et al.,
2006; Kauffman, 2001) suggests a company must strike
in order for an ethical response to be perceived as
also authentic.
While their frequency of apology early in the wake
of a mega-damage transgression may have provoked
negative reactions, its timing was generally consistent
with recommendations for ethical apology – initial
apologies should occur very quickly. Across the crisis
changes in BP’s atonement messages indicate an effort
to be sensitive to the evolving situation. Evidence of
this was their consistent use of corrective action as a
tactic throughout the crisis – that no matter what,
they emphasized actions they were taking to address
the problem they created. Yet, it was in the adaptation
of their atonement messaging in August that demon-
strates a shift in their efforts to communicate compas-
sion and build community to a more definitive effort
to move beyond the crisis and emphasize their com-
mitment to long-term recovery.
6. Conclusions
Based on all of BP’s press releases and its engage-
ment on Facebook and Twitter, we conclude that
the content and manner of BP’s apology demon-
strated ethical apology. However, the company’s
communication of remorse may have been less
believable because in the first 10 days of the crisis,
they apologized too often and focused on empathy
later. This may suggest that for ethical apology to
be credible, a transgressor should communicate
acknowledgement, empathy and action together
rather than in phases across a crisis. In addition,
the contexts for apology including Congressional
Hearings, responses to criticism and the broader
crisis response strategy that did include defensive
strategies – even stonewalling (see Diers-Lawson
et al., 2013; Smithson et al., 2013) may have struc-
turally weakened the possibility for the ethical apol-
ogy to be believable. These findings offer a strong
indicator about the obstacles that transgressing orga-
nizations face if they are to ethically apologize and
be believed. More directly, communicating ethical
apology may be insufficient for the apology to be
credible; factors such as effective timing, context
and source influence the believability of the content;
regardless of whether its content is ethical.
Theoretically, this research also demonstrates that
developing an ethics-based evaluation of an organiza-
tion’s crisis response helps to separate the substance
of an organization’s response to a crisis from the per-
ceptions of that response. In this way, we can not only
better understand the construction of ethical crisis
response but also more effectively evaluate the
whether an organization is successful in maintaining or
Table 6. Significant Scheffe Results for Message Timing
Dependent variable Test (I) Test (J) Mean difference (I–J) Significance
Apology April May .17 .03
July .22 .001
August .26 .000
September .20 .005
May August .08 .005
June July .06 .000
August .11 .000
July August .04 .04
August September .06 .008
Compassion August September .13 .02
Offering assurances June August .19 .000
July August .21 .000
August September .23 .000
Eliciting sympathy May August .07 .04
June August .05 .002
Transparency June September .15 .01
July September .17 .003
August September .14 .02
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enhancing its relationships after crises. We argue the
separation of the content and manner of apology,
using the ethical apology framework, is meaningful to
avoid confusing unethical responses to crises with
unsuccessful ones.
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